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ABSTRACT
During the 1970s and 1980s, there existed a gap between the strategic mobility
requirement and the nations cargo airlift assets to meet this requirement. Consequently,
the Military Airlift Command developed and implemented the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Enhancement Program (CEP) to bridge this gap. Civilian airlines were given monetary
and other incentives to modify their existing wide-body passenger aircraft enabling them
to carry military-sized cargo in the event of military necessity. This study examines the
National Defense Airlift System, the concept behind the CEP's development and reasons
for its failure. It also discusses whether the current military, Congressional, and airline
environments are conducive to a revitalization of the CEP. It was determined that the
current environments do not favor a re-birth of the CEP. However, if a CEP were
deemed necessary to meet a potential future gap in the strategic mobility requirement,
actions could be taken by AMC, Congress, and airlines to aid its success. Some of these
actions are: developing adequate incentives enticing airline participation, ensuring even
distribution of enhanced aircraft among CEP participants, investigating use of medium-
sized aircraft, investigating benefits of placing financial liens on enhanced aircraft, and
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the formulation and subsequent
termination of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Enhancement Program (CEP). Additionally,
the research focuses on whether a revitalization effort of the CEP, or a derivative
program, is warranted in today's environment to ensure the U.S. can meet its defense
transportation requirements brought about by participation in global military activities.
B. BACKGROUND
Over the past decades, the military transportation requirements for moving
military personnel, equipment, and supplies throughout the globe have changed
dramatically. This change in requirements has resulted in part due to the changing world
political atmosphere as well as to current fiscal and budgetary constraints.
One of the primary goals of the United States Military airlift policy, however, has
remained steadfast over the past decades. This goal is to maximize the available wartime
reserve of airlift capacity for use during a time of national need. In the development of
this policy, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was created to ensure the defense
mobility requirement for personnel, equipment, and supplies could be met and
maintained.
The CRAF program, now managed by the Air Mobility Command (AMC), a
component of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), was
founded in 1952 based upon the guidance from president Truman in the aftermath of
demands placed on military airlift after World War Two and during the Berlin Airlift.
The CRAF fleet is compromised of U.S. registered civil transport aircraft that possess the
range, payload, speed, and configuration to perform Department of Defense (DoD)
directed missions. Until recently, the U.S. strategic airlift system, which includes both
military and civilian aircraft, has consistently fallen short of the proposed wartime
mobility requirement. In an attempt to fill this mobility requirements gap during the
1980's, the Military Airlift Command (MAC), predecessors to the AMC, created and
implemented the CEP. This program was aimed at filling the gap through subsidizing
the conversion of jumbo-sized aircraft into cargo-carrying platforms. Although this
program did result in a total of 23 aircraft being converted, the program was discontinued
in 1991.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
Based on the lessons learned from the creation and termination of the CEP, is
a re-vitalization of the CEP concept in today's environment warranted?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What was the impetus behind the creation of CRAP and what
value does it play within the national airlift system in meeting
defense transportation needs?
b. What was the role of CEP within the larger CRAF program and
what were the expected advantages of CEP?
c. What were the dominant problems inherent in CEP and were these
problems unavoidable?
d What were some of the legal guidelines utilized in CEP and could
they be re-written to help insure an effective CEP program today?
e. Was the scope of the acceptable participants in CEP too limited?
Should it have been widened to include all civilian airlines?
f. What were the incentives available to CEP participants and were
they sufficient? Would these same incentives be sufficient today?
g. Given the aging of our legacy transport aircraft (C-141 Starlifter,
and C-5 Galaxy), and the cutback to procure only 120 C-17's, what
position is AMC now in to insure current defense cargo
transportation requirements are met?
h. Was the scope of aircraft type too limited in the CEP and should it
be modified to include not just wide-body aircraft but medium
size aircraft if the CEP were to be implemented today.
D. SCOPE
This research focuses on providing an impartial analysis of the issues pertaining
to the development and demise of the CEP. This study specifically addresses the
reasons for initiating CEP, its termination, and whether the barriers to its success were
unavoidable. Additionally, this research paper explores if these barriers could be
overcome in the development of a future "enhancement" program.
E. METHODOLOGY
This research paper integrates and analyzes information obtained through
various military and civilian transportation agency publications, reports, manuals,
instructions, and phone interviews. The projected primary sources of information for this
study have been collected with the assistance of, but not limited to, the following:
• United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
• Air Mobility Command (AMC)
• Logistics Management Institute (LMI)
• United States Government Accounting Office (GAO)
• Various civil air carriers
Research was also conducted through an in-depth review of military and civilian
literature. Additionally, personal interviews were conducted with individuals at the
CRAF Management Office in AMC, as well as civilian employees at various CRAF
participating air carriers.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II (National Defense Airlift System) provides an overview of the
National Defense Airlift System. It provides information on the two components of this
system, military and civilian airlift. This chapter concludes with information on the
current airlift requirement and capability and the actions considered by AMC to decrease
the past deficit.
Chapter III (Enhancement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: From Concept to
Reality) introduces the CEP and provides the concept behind its creation. Additionally,
the advantages and disadvantages are presented. The actual results of CEP
implementation are discussed followed by the concerns of both the civil air carriers and
the government. Chapter III concludes with the actions that the Military Airlift
Command (MAC) initiated in dealing with these concerns.
Chapter IV (Contemporary Environment and Mitigating Solutions) presents some
contemporary issues of the military, Congress, and civilian air carriers pertaining to the
current U.S. mobility requirement situation in relation to a possible new CEP program. It
concludes with presenting mitigating solutions for the military, Congress, and air carriers
if a CEP were deemed necessary.
Chapter V (Conclusions and Recommendations) summarizes the findings of the
research, answers the research questions, and presents recommendations for further
research and study.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This research has the potential to benefit AMC in two ways. First, it presents the
CEP developmental factors as well as the program implementation shortfalls that led to
the program's termination. Second, it presents the contemporary concerns of the
military, Congress, and civilian airline sector and assists in determining if the current
atmosphere is conducive to a successful CEP reactivation.

II. NATIONAL DEFENSE AIRLIFT SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
Before examining the viability of re-implementing the CRAF Enhancement
program, it is essential that the National Defense Airlift System components and their
roles be understood. This chapter presents the purpose of the National Defense Airlift
System and its two components, military and civilian airlift. Additionally, it presents
information on the nation's current airlift requirement, capability, and actions that have
been considered by AMC to ensure that DoD's defense mobility requirements are met.
B. PURPOSE OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AIRLIFT SYSTEM
The 1987 National Defense Airlift Policy objective, initiated by Military Airlift
Command (MAC) and signed into effect by President Reagan, is to "ensure that both the
military and civilian airlift resources will be able to meet defense mobilization and
deployment requirements in support of U.S. defense of foreign policies." [Ref. 1] The
1987 National Airlift Policy attempts to consider all of the mobility variables by further
stating that the airlift system should be developed to "effectively and efficiently meet
established requirements for aircraft in both peacetime and in the event of crisis or war."
[Ref. 1] This policy, however, can cause some confusion because the most effective
wartime airlift force might prove to be inefficient in peacetime and vice versa.
When the current National Airlift Policy was generated, much of the focus was
placed on the wartime mobility requirement in comparison to the peacetime requirement.
The cold war era had not yet ended causing this military requirement focus. The MAC
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans reinforced this perception in his interpretation of the
newly approved policy statement. He stated, "the new statement remains the keystone of
our national submission, that the peacetime force of MAC and the mobilization base of
the commercial air carrier industry must reflect wartime needs." [Ref. 2]
Today's environment, however, has changed dramatically in comparison to the
cold war mobilization philosophy. The US has taken the role of "peacekeeper'" and
subsequently has increased opportunities and demands to utilize airlift in situations short
of war. It is for this reason that the focus of AMC and of USTRANSCOM has shifted
away from an almost exclusive emphasis on wartime requirements.
However, the issue of military versus civilian roles in the airlift system remains
an area of concern. Since World War II, situations have occurred where proponents of
the civil air and military components have had differing views over who should move
military passengers and cargo during peacetime. Military proponents have claimed that
the peacetime movement of cargo and passengers on military aircraft is a cost-effective
by-product of the need to train and exercise the military's wartime airlift system.
[Ref. 3: p. 206] Commercial proponents hold that this view is unfair and that airlines
could carry most of the military cargo and passengers more effectively than the military.
[Ref. 3: p. 205] The present National Airlift Policy settles these differences by stating:
During peacetime, the Department of Defense regulations for passenger
and/or cargo airlift shall be satisfied by the procurement of airlift from
commercial air carriers participating in the CRAF program, to the extent
that the Department of Defense determines that such airlift is suitable and
responsive to the military requirement. [Ref. 1]
Since the defense airlift system components' roles differ during peacetime and
wartime, the current National Airlift Policy developed a compromise that not just
maintains an airlift force capable of meeting either peacetime or wartime requirements,
but meets both sets of requirements. One of the ultimate goals of the National Airlift
Policy is to provide the greatest possible reserve of wartime airlift capacity while
maintaining an efficient and effective airlift force capable of filling DoD's peacetime
mobility requirements.
C. NATIONAL DEFENSE AIRLIFT SYSTEM COMPONENTS
1. Military Airlift
a. Organization
The military's portion of the National Defense Airlift System is comprised
of active duty Air Force transportation units managed by AMC, and Air Reserve
Component (ARC) units. The ARC can be further divided into Air Force Reserve and
Air National Guard (ANG) units . Air Force Reserve units report to the Air Force Chief
of Staff (AFCOS) during peacetime and to AMC during wartime. [Ref. 4: p. 4] Air
National Guard units report to their governors and state Air National Guard headquarters
during peacetime and to AMC during wartime. [Ref. 4:p. 22,23] During time of war,
AMC has the overall responsibility to ensure the nation's strategic mobility
requirements are satisfied. [Ref. 4:p. 12]
Active duty Air Force transportation units provide 45 percent of the
nation's military and civilian contract strategic mobility capacity. The primary purpose
of these units is to provide airlift assets for the transportation of U.S. military personnel
and cargo to all U.S. military bases and selected regions of the world requiring U.S.
military presence. [Ref. 4:p.22] Regularly scheduled flights, termed 'channel flights,"
are flown to predetermined locations throughout the world in support of U.S. military
doctrine. Additionally, unscheduled contingency flights are also flown with minimal
notice. Active duty Air Force personnel man these units in which they train and operate
to maintain an effective reaction capability in the event of any required U.S. military
mobilization. [Ref. 4]
The primary role of the ARC is to train reserve personnel and to be ready
for wartime mobilization. [Ref. 4: Summary] During peacetime, the ARC provides
military cargo airlift as a by-product of training. The ARC units require the same global
training and experience as the active duty Air Force units and provide 25 percent of
the airlift capacity. 1 [Ref 4:p. 17] Most of the peacetime ARC missions have long
scheduled lead times, are of limited duration, and have firm return dates making them
compatible with the part-time nature of the reservist' participation. [Ref. 4:p. 18] In
wartime, ARC reserve units can be called to serve in an active duty status and
report directly to AMC for mission assignments. [Ref. 4:p. 25]
b. Military Airlift Assets
Five types of aircraft make-up the military component. These aircraft
are the C-130, C-141, C-5, C-17, and KC-10. Specific aircraft capabilities are: [Ref. 6]
1 The remaining 30 percent is performed by civilian contract airlift
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• The C-130 is a turbo prop, non air-fuelable, assault aircraft that can deliver
troops or cargo in either airdrop or airland operations. It can carry 92 ground
troops with required field gear, 64 paratroopers, 74 litters, or six pallets. The
maximum affective range with a 25 ton payload is 2000 nautical miles.. Its
primary use is in intra-theater operations.
• The C-141 is an air-refuelable, long range jet transport which can carry 200
ground troops, 103 litter patients, or 13 pallets. It can transport a 45 ton
payload up to 1970 nautical miles without refueling and can airdrop 35 tons of
cargo or 155 paratroopers.
• The C-5 is an air refuelable, long range heavy lift transport aircraft designed
to lift a wide variety of combat and support units, personnel, military supplies,
munitions, and equipment. It can carry 73 troops and 36 military pallets in its
normal configuration or up to 340 troops with associated baggage in its total
airbus configuration. It can carry a payload of 121 tons up to 1650 nautical
miles.
• The C-17 is air refuelable, long range, heavy lift jet transport aircraft which
operates efficiently in intra-theater and inter-theater roles. It is designed for
airdrop, airland, and parachute delivery of all sizes of equipment. It can carry
up to 144 troops with 18 pallets and has a maximum range of 2400 nautical
miles with a 86 ton payload. It is capable of delivering cargo and/or supplies
directly into the forward operating location.
• The KC-10 is an air refuelable, long range aircraft capable of cargo carrying,
air-to-air refueling, or both. In its cargo role can carry 27 pallets and a
payload of 85 tons over 3400 nautical miles. In its refueling mode it can carry
390,000 lbs of fuel.
All of these aircraft have been designed to meet the requirements that
military mobilization require. The C-130, C-5, C-141, and C-17 all have a high "T" tail
to facilitate the loading of oversized and outsized cargo as well as perform airdrop
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functions Additionally, these aircraft have large cargo doors and ramps to accommodate
this large cargo, and high wing placement to permit operations from austere airfields
[Ref 7] This high wing placement also results in the aircraft's cargo floor being close to
the ground permitting easy loading and unloading of cargo and wheeled vehicles These
features make it possible for the these aircraft to conduct their unique missions,
however, they are unable to move passengers and smaller cargo as efficiently as can
civilian aircraft due to the time required to shift configurations. Therefore, it is
uncommon to find these same characteristics in the civilian airline sector.
The KC-10's main function is that of an airborne re-fueling platform.
However, it can perform the cargo function relatively well. AMC currently plans to
operate 39 of these KC-10 aircraft in a cargo carrying mode during crisis operations.
[Ref. 8]
c. Military Airlift Advantages
The military component provides capabilities that the civilian component
can not provide. Some of the more important advantages are:
• Civilian air carriers are often unable and/or unwilling to transport passengers
into militarily desired locations. Often hostile locations or locations with ill-
prepared airstrips are more likely to be served with military aircraft only.
• Air-dropping operations of both personnel and supplies are best performed by
military aircraft and flight crews.
• Civilian aircraft can not accommodate all of DoD's cargo. Few CRAF
aircraft can carry oversized cargo (cargo which can not fit on a standard Air
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Force pallet, requiring a C-130 aircraft or larger) and none can carry outsized
cargo (cargo requiring a C-5 or C-17). [Ref. 5]
• Military aircraft and aircrews have the advantage to change destination,
payloads, and overall mission requirements with short notification.
Commercial airlift could attain a similar ability by placing aircraft and
aircrews on "alert" status. However, this would be cumbersome with civilian
unionized employees and conflicting commercial obligations.
• During missions, the military have the distinct advantage to observe and relay
classified information to the appropriate military agencies.
2. Civilian Airlift
In times of both peace and war, the civilian airlift sector currently adds the
remaining 30 percent of required airlift capacity to the National Defense Airlift System.
The two components of this civilian airlift capability are the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and
civilian contract airlift.
a. Civil Reserve Air Fleet
The military use of commercial aircraft during World War II and later in
the Korean War led to the creation of CRAF. During both time frames, the reason for
using airliners instead of military transports was simple: the nation owned few transport
aircraft and greatly needed additional aircraft to carry out its missions. The military
gained its first experience in working with the airlines in World War II when president
Roosevelt directed the Secretary of War on December 31, 1941 to take possession of any
commercial aviation assets required for the war effort. [Ref 9] At that time, AMC, then
called the Air Corps Ferrying Command, could not meet the demand for airlift from
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government-owned airlift assets. One of the Ferrying Command's first missions was to
ferry American built, lend-lease aircraft overseas to the United Kingdom [Ref 10]
Commercial aircraft Hew hundreds of missions and made significant contributions during
World War II. Commercial aircraft also flew military missions during the Berlin Crisis in
1948-49 when airlift was the only means of delivering food and supplies to West Berlin.
[Ref. 10]
One decade later, the Air Force needed help from the civilian airline
industry again for the Korean Conflict. Between World War II and the Korean Conflict,
military transport capability had languished, while during this same period, the civil
aviation industry grew rapidly. The military's previous experience with the airlines,
combined with the beginning of the Korean War requirements and insufficient airlift
resources, led president Truman to consider establishing a more permanent arrangement
with the airlines. [Ref. 10]
In December 1951, President Truman issued an executive order later
signed by his successor, President Eisenhower. This direction called for a program to
formalize agreements between DoD and the airlines for the use of their aircraft during
military contingencies. This Joint Memorandum of Understanding (JMOU) signed in
1952 established the CRAF. With this agreement, the CRAF did away with the ad-hoc
use of commercial aircraft, and allowed for the first time, systematic planning
beforehand for their use under predetermined circumstances. [Ref. 10] In exchange for
their commitment, CRAF participants receive priority access to a large portion of DoD's
peacetime passenger and cargo airlift business. This additional airlift capability created
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by CRAF does not require the government to purchase, man, or maintain any of these
aircraft during peacetime. [Ref. 1 1]
CRAF was, and still is, designed to be activated incrementally in three
stages to provide a force depending on specific mobility requirements. Stage I presently
provides access to 80 long-range international aircraft. Stage II provides 238 aircraft, and
Stage III provides for full mobilization of all 379 aircraft currently in the CRAF program.
[Ref. 12] All of these stages can be activated by the Commander in Chief,
USTRANSCOM, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Activation of Stages I
and II require a response time of 24 hours or less after notification. Stage III requires a
response time of 48 hours or less. [Ref. 13] The effectiveness of the CRAF program was
proven during its first and only full-scale activation during the Gulf Crisis. During Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, 27 percent of the airlift cargo and over 60 percent of passenger
movement was accomplished by CRAF assets. (Stages I and II were activated) [Ref. 14]
b. Civilian Contract Airlift
Unlike CRAF activation, civilian contract airlift occurs during a time of
peace and in war. Currently, 90 percent of DoD's passenger requirement and 30 percent
of its cargo requirement is transported by civilian air carriers. A civilian air carrier must
be a participating member in CRAF in order to bid for DoD contract airlift business. The
DoD airlift requirement is spread across all contract participants depending on the
number and type of aircraft they have enrolled in the CRAF program. [Ref. 13]
15
Figure 1 shows the peacetime and wartime relationships between the















Fig. 1, Peacetime and Wartime Reporting Diagram
CURRENT AIRLIFT REQUIREMENT
Since 1981, the strategic airlift requirement to move military cargo has been
steadily decreasing. In 1981, a Congressional ly mandated Mobility Study determined
that 66 million-ton-miles/day (MTM/D) had to be moved in order to meet the minimum
strategic airlift requirement to maintain the successful involvement of U.S. forces in a
major regional conflict. The airlift capability at that time permitted movement of only 56
MTM/D using all available military and CRAF assets. [Ref. 9:p. 57] MTM/D is the term
used to describe an aggregate quantity of cargo-airlift capacity. The equation for
calculating this figure for a single aircraft is:2
2 This research paper will not address the individual equation components. MTM/D will be used as a
comparison term only to demonstrate the relationship between the past/present airlift capability.
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MTM/D = (Block Speed)*(Utilization rate)*(Pavload)*(Productivity factor)
1,000,000 nautical miles
The requirement of 66 MTM/D remained constant throughout the 1980s After
the Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm), the requirement was reduced to 52 MTM/D
based on analysis presented in the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). This new level
also reflected the fiscal constraints imposed upon DoD in conjunction with the overall
cutback in military bases, personnel, and equipment. [Ref 4] The nation's strategic
airlift requirement was lowered further to its current level of 49.7 MTM/D as a
consequence of the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review
(MRSBURU). [Ref. 15]
The 1981 Mobility Study identified a strategic transportation shortfall between
the strategic requirement and the combined available capacity from CRAF and military
airlift assets. [Ref. 12] The Civil Reserve Air Fleet Enhancement Program (CEP) was
implemented during the 1980s to cover the 10 MTM/D requirements shortfall (66
MTM/D required, 56 MTM/D available) through the use of incentives including
monetary reimbursements provided to CEP participants. [Ref. 3:p. 31] CEP participants
agreed in return for these incentives to modify selected jumbo-size passenger aircraft
permitting the quick transformation from passenger to cargo configuration to
accommodate the larger oversized military cargo. However, the CEP fell short of its
expected goal of 60 enhanced aircraft to fill the gap due to a number of barriers. [Ref. 3]
The CEP has since been discontinued after acquiring only 23 enhanced aircraft. A
17
detailed discussion on the creation and termination of the CEP program is presented in
Chapter III.
The current strategic mobility capacity of 51.2 MTM/D exceeds the strategic
requirement of 49.7 MTM/D, and consequently there is no gap. [Ref. 16] However,
there was still a gap when the requirement was 52 MTM/D based on the MRS. Figure 2
shows the current and forcasted contributing cargo airlift capacity in MTM/D provided
by military and CRAF assets.
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Fig. 2, Strategic Airlift Capacity [Ref. 17]
E. AMC CONSIDERATIONS
Prior to the lowering of the strategic mobility requirement to 49.7 MTM/D,
AMC had considered a number of proposals to ensure it could meet the greater mobility
18
requirement. The C-141 was considered for a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
which has since been rejected due to the programs high cost. [Ref. 18] This
cancellation has resulted in all active duty C-141 airframes being retired by 2001, with
the remaining reserve airframes being retired by 2006. The purchase of additional C-5's
was also considered. However, this was rejected because of the high life-cycle costs, as
well as high requirements for forward-placed airstrip ramp capacity, a particularly
scarce resource. [Ref. 18] Another alternative considered to fill the requirement gap
was utilizing non-developmental aircraft. This alternative involved the purchasing of
existing civilian aircraft capable of carrying, or being modified to carry, military-size
cargo. [Ref. 4] The principle non-developmental aircraft candidate was the Boeing 747.
There were advantages in using this non-developmental approach. First, the
acquisition time could be shortened allowing a quick solution to the requirements
shortfall. Second, the cost of designing, constructing, and testing new airframes is much
more costly than utilizing existing airframes. However, the non-developmental program
would still take until the year 2001 to get up and running. [Ref 19]
This non-developmental program, if it could have been initiated in a time-
efficient manner, did offer the potential to create a short term solution to the previous
shortfall situation. However, the current strategic airlift requirement is now attainable,
making the non-developmental program unnecessary. [Figure 1]
AMC is in a good position to meet the strategic mobility requirement set forth
by the MRSBURU. It has the required military (Active Duty Air Force and ARC) and
civilian (CRAF) airlift assets to meet this transportation requirement, both for passenger
19
and cargo movement. The question remains, whether the CEP program deserves to be
re-visited for future implementation even though a strategic cargo requirements gap does
not exist today. The following chapter presents and analyzes the CEP concept and its
operational effectiveness.
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III. ENHANCEMENT OF THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET: FROM
CONCEPT TO REALITY
A. INTRODUCTION
Prior to determining if the re-implementation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Enhancement Program (CEP) has a chance for success in today's environment, it is
essential to first examine the concept of the enhancement program. This chapter begins
by presenting the concept behind the development of the CEP and its expected
advantages. Other CEP considerations are also discussed concerning aircraft type and
age, as well as the obligated service requirement of acceptable CEP aircraft. The
implementation of the CEP is then be presented, followed by problems that arose during
its evolution. These problems concern the profitability of the participating air carriers
and Congressional concerns that developed throughout the program's life cycle. Finally,
this chapter concludes with the actions that Military Airlift Command (MAC) initiated in
response to the concerns of both the airlines and Congress.
B. CRAF ENHANCEMENT CONCEPT
In 1973, MAC conducted the Emergency Cargo Airlift Capabilities Study, which
subsequently led to the creation of the CRAF enhancement concept. The study
recommended the continuation of the C-5 wing-modification program, increasing the
capacity of the C-141 to accommodate additional cargo, and to improve the cargo
capabilities of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. [Ref. 20: p. 34]
The CRAF enhancement concept, an outgrowth of improving the cargo
capabilities of the CRAF, was created to ensure availability of additional CRAF cargo
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airlift capability to supplement current military cargo capability within the CRAF. The
program attempted to achieve this goal by encouraging passenger air carriers to modify a
portion of their existing airframes already in the CRAF program into aircraft that could
be quickly transformed from a passenger configuration into a cargo configuration should
the need arise. [Ref. 20] Airframes like this are often called "cargo-convertible."
At the time of concept development, there existed an excess supply of passenger-
carrying capability, and a cargo-carrying shortfall if all three stages of the CRAF program
were to be activated. Consequently, CRAF enhancement increased the value of the
selected passenger aircraft through the creation of these cargo-convertibie platforms.
C. EXPECTED ADVANTAGES
The CRAF Enhancement Program was initiated because it had two very attractive
expected advantages [Ref. 20]:
• The CEP offered a method of increasing supplemental cargo airlift capability
without the civil air carriers having to purchase more aircraft. The required
modifications were to be performed on aircraft already purchased by the
carriers and in production, or, were to be performed on aircraft already in the
airline's active inventory.
• Since the CEP would have required no major design or development phases, it
provided a means for relatively quickly nullifying the then-present cargo
airlift capability shortfall. The required modifications could have been
conducted quickly on existing airframes and incorporated into aircraft that
were currently in production.
22
D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the aforementioned advantages of the CEP, other issues must have
also been considered in order to effectively implement the program.
1. Determination of Suitable Aircraft
One issue is the determination of what type of aircraft should be eligible for the
enhancement modifications. The individual aircraft characteristics, such as speed, range,
and existing passenger carrying capability, must be analyzed to determine those aircraft
that are more desirable than others. Aircraft design standards would have to be
established to ensure that only the most suitable aircraft are actually modified. MAC
determined that the B-747 was the most suitable airframe meeting the required
criteria. [Ref 22:p. 14]
2. Determination of Suitable Aircraft Age
A second issue is the determination of how old acceptable aircraft may be. This
is a necessary requirement because the older aircraft may not meet the efficiency
requirements previously mentioned. Additionally, older aircraft generally have shorter
remaining service lives.
3. Determination of Obligation
A third issue is establishing how long the enhanced aircraft would be obligated
to the CRAF service and under what conditions would the air carriers be required to
make the aircraft available for CRAF service. Since the enhancements would be
performed on jumbo-sized B-747 aircraft, activation of CEP aircraft could negatively
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impact the carriers' ability to satisfy current customer demand on long distance domestic
and international flights, where the jumbo-size aircraft generally operate. [Ref. 25:p 32]
The CRAF carrier may then permanently lose this customer base to non-CRAF
competition.
4. Incentives
Initially, it may appear that the enhancement concept was a cost effective method
of creating additional cargo capability within the CRAF without the military or civil
carriers having to purchase additional aircraft. However, the success of the
enhancement program depended on the capability of MAC to provide the proper
incentives to the civil air carriers thereby making their participation in the program a
profitable endeavor. Since carriers are profit driven, and the additional weight of these
cargo-convertible aircraft would drive-up the operating costs, it is apparent that more
effective incentives should have been provided to entice their participation.
In its most basic form, the CRAF Enhancement concept had the potential to be a
cost effective and timely method to increase our nation's cargo airlift capability without
requiring an increase in the aggregate capability of the military and civilian air carriers.
However, when the program was actually implemented, and some unforeseen issues
began to surface, support for the CEP fell resulting in its termination. The following
examines the CEP's actual implementation.
E. IMPLEMENTATION OF CEP
In response to the 1973 Emergency Cargo Airlift Capabilities Study, MAC
generated an Airlift Master Plan that laid out how MAC would accomplish meeting its
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strategic airlift goal. One of the most efficient elements of this plan was the CEP. It
would increase the number of cargo capable aircraft available within the CRAF structure.
The CEP program offered incentives to the commercial air carriers if they agreed to
incorporate cargo-convertible features into their aircraft. These modifications included:
[Ref. 20: p. 29]
• Reinforced flooring and strengthened main deck and deck mountings to
permit transport of armed vehicles.
• Installation of rails and rollers to accept military-size pallets.
• Installation of side-load cargo doors.
• Modification to existing seating to permit quick removal.
The first CEP contract was awarded in 1980 to United Airlines for the
modification of one B-747 aircraft which took nearly two years to complete at a cost of
$27.5 million. This cost was divided equally between DoD and United Airlines.
However, United Airlines was the only initial airline to participate in the program. The
primary reason was that the program was limited to only modifying aircraft coming off
the assembly line. But, because the economy was in a recession, few airlines were
looking to purchase new aircraft. [Ref. 21]
In 1983, a second version of the CEP was initiated. Instead of new aircraft, MAC
asked civil air carriers to consider modifications to existing airframes already in use. A
contract was signed with Pam Am World Airways to modify 19 Boeing 747 aircraft. The
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final aircraft in this contract was completed in 1990 with the total contract costing DoD
an estimated $532 million dollars. The associated conversion cost for each aircraft in
this second version of CEP amounted to approximately $28 million. [Ref. 21: p. 39]
MAC had hoped to have nearly 60 aircraft modified by 1990, however, the commercial
carriers were slow to participate because the economic incentives were not high enough
to offset the increased operating cost.
In an attempt to overcome these complaints from the carriers, a third version of
the CEP was initiated by congress in 1986. Known as Public Law 97-86, it re-stated
Congressional support for the CRAF program and authorized DoD to pay for all of the
modification costs associated with the conversions. If the participating passenger carriers
agreed not to use the cargo-convertible feature during peacetime, DoD agreed to
compensate fully the increased operating cost associated with these modifications.
[Ref. 22] With these incentives, both Evergreen Airline and Fed Ex took advantage of
the program. Fed Ex modified two B-747 aircraft whereas Evergreen modified only one
B-747 aircraft. [Ref. 22:p 46] Although Fed Ex's primary business is cargo movement,
the aircraft most likely still required modifications such as reinforcing cargo decking and
cargo door enlargement to handle heavier and larger outsized military cargo. Once
contracted to the CEP, these aircraft were committed to the CRAF program for a period
of 12 years. [Ref 22: p.34]
By the end of 1987, 14 years after the CEP concept creation, it became apparent
that there still existed significant barriers to the overall success of the CRAF
Enhancement Program. With the 23 total aircraft including the new Evergreen and Fed
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Ex enhanced aircraft and the existing Pan Am and United Airlines aircraft, MAC only
achieved a 62 MTM/D capacity. This fell short of its requirement of 66 MTMD as
set forth by the 1981 Congressional Mobility Study. [Ref. 20: p. 34,78]
Following the Gulf War, Pan Am, the largest CEP participating airline with 19 enhanced
aircraft, filed for bankruptcy. Of these 19 aircraft, five were obtained for government use
and the remainder were purchased by other earners. [Ref. 7] Pan Am's bankruptcy, in
the context of the previous problems, convinced Congress that the CEP was not a cost
effective method to increase the nation's strategic cargo airlift capability and canceled
the program in 1991. [Ref. 20: p. 63]
F. CRAF ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM PROBLEMS
The barriers to the Enhancement program's success can be categorized into two
areas, the concerns of the civil air carriers and the concerns of Congress. The air
carriers' focus was on the operating, financial, and other commercial issues associated
with their participation in the CEP. The focus of Congress was on making sure the
program sufficiently and cost effectively increased cargo capacity.
1. Profitability of the Air Carriers
In 1974, the concept of the enhancement program was initially very well received
by the air carriers. [Ref. 22 :p. 16] However, as time elapsed, more of the details and
issues surrounding the enhancement program came into view, causing carriers to become
disenchanted with the program.
The first important issue to the carriers was that the aircraft modifications and
associated financial package would be profitable. In 1980 the government indicated that
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it would pay for the costs associated with the modifications, however, confusion arose as
to how the government would reimburse the carriers for the increased operating costs
with the new heavier aircraft, such as higher fuel consumption The first contract
awarded in 1980 requested United Airlines to estimate the foreseen increase in
operating cost, but made no provisions on the method of reimbursement. United
Airlines estimated that the enhanced aircraft would experience an eight percent increase
in fuel consumption due to its increased weight. United Airlines then forwarded to
MAC the total estimated additional operating cost resulting from the modifications for
the remaining life of the aircraft. [Ref. 23:p. 5] Realizing the carriers' uneasiness, MAC
developed a payment plan in 1983 that consisted of a one-time lump-sum payment
equal to this estimated increased operating cost. [Ref. 23] However, the air carriers
were also concerned with the volatility of the oil and gas prices they had recently
experienced which led to uneasiness in accepting a lump-sum payment. In fact, prior to
United Airlines signing the first contract, Braniff International Airways terminated its
negotiations with MAC for this very reason. [Ref. 23: p. 121]
MAC, realizing some of the financial concerns of the civil air carriers, developed
a "Bonus Award Plan" that went above the existing cost reimbursements. To provide
this additional incentive, MAC redistributed its contract award policy to favor those
carriers that participated in the CEP. [Ref. 24:p. 187] The Bonus Award Plan guaranteed
that CEP participants would receive higher consideration over non-CEP participants in
the peacetime contract award process. MAC estimated that each CEP participant could
expect a 15 percent increase in asset utilization. [Ref. 24:p.33]
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The second most important issue to the air carriers concerned the level of
government commitment to the CEP. In 1979, when the CEP was officially created,
Congress appropriated only $7.5 million for the CEP, less than one-half of the cost to
convert a single aircraft. [Ref. 24: p. 97] Consequently, many of the large carriers were
hesitant to become contractually bound to the program given the government's seemingly
lack of commitment. The carriers were also concerned about getting involved in a long
1 2 year CRAF Enhancement Program contract and loosing money should the government
choose to withdraw funding or change the guidelines of the program. [Ref. 24: p. 155]
2. Congressional Concerns
With the Cold War still raging in the late 1970s, it was obvious to Congress that
additional strategic airlift capability was needed. In fact, the House Committee on
Armed Services 1975 hearings on the future of military airlift was very supportive of the
enhancement concept. [Ref 25: p. 203] However, the support generated during these
hearings did not produce the funds to make the program a reality. Congress had concerns
on the effectiveness of the enhancement concept and was unwilling to provide the
required funding until these concerns were addressed.
Congress's primary concern regarding the enhancement program was that it did
not fully understand the concept behind the program. In 1976, blame was accepted by
the Secretary of Defense siting that "The failure ofCRAF to pass Congressional scrutiny
is due to DoD's failure to properly explain the need for the CRAF modifications."
[Ref. 26: p. 187] Until Congress was aware of the motives and reasoning behind the
enhancement concept, it would not provide the needed funding.
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Congress was also concerned that the enhancement program appeared to be
nothing more that another subsidy tor the civil air carriers. In 1975, Sen. Barry
Goldvvater claimed that the recent disapproval for CRAF enhancement funding was
because "they felt that the proposed modification to commercial airline aircraft was more
of a blessing to the airlines that to 000." [Ref. 26: p 202]
The most pronounced barrier to congressional approval of the enhancement
program was concern about government liabilities if a CRAF-enhanced aircraft was
damaged, or in any accident that might be linked to the airframe enhancements.
Congress was also worried about access to these modified aircraft if the carriers chose to
lease or sell these aircraft. Additionally, they felt that the public's investment in these
aircraft could be totally lost if a participating carrier filed for bankruptcy. [Ref. 26: p. 65]
G. MAC'S RESPONSE TO AIRLINE AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS
MAC realized that in order to transform the enhancement concept into a
successful program, it would have to address both the concerns of the civil air carriers,
and especially those of Congress. The following presents the actions taken by MAC to
overcome these concerns and attempt to develop the enhancement concept into a
successful and worthwhile program.
1. Mac's Actions Pertaining to the Civilian Air Carriers
The actions MAC took in response to the concerns of the civil air carriers were
well received by the air carriers. In addressing the carriers' concern on the profitability
of the enhancement program, MAC understood that the increased share of peacetime
airlift contracts promised to enhancement participants (Bonus Award Plan) was not a
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large enough incentive. In fact, CEP participants only realized an average of three
percent gain in asset utilization resulting from the Bonus Award Plan, far below MAC's
15 percent estimate. Because of this, MAC realized that the solution to the incentive
problem was outside the current procurement award structure. [Ref 26: p. 46]
MAC initiated the awarding of incentives that went beyond the existing
reimbursement incentives for the cost of the enhancement modifications. These included
targeting the "credit risk" carriers and promising government guaranteed loans, providing
low interest loans, tax and depreciation incentives, and providing assistance in obtaining
the required procurement insurance. Additionally, in 1985 MAC was able to gain
approval for an initial cash incentive of $500,000 dollars provided to the carriers which
chose to participate in the enhancement program. [Ref. 26]
Realizing that another barrier in gaining greater participation in the enhancement
program was the carrier's concern over reimbursement for the increased operating costs
of the heavier enhanced aircraft, MAC persuaded Congress to include a fuel price
adjustment clause in future enhancement contracts. [Ref. 27]
The civil air carriers received these actions, taken by MAC on their behalf, as an
indication that MAC was willing to develop the CEP into a worthwhile program for all
participants. However, MAC was never fully successful at eliminating the carriers'
concern that the government was not fully committed to the enhancement program. The
six years that elapsed from the program's conception in 1973 to the first fiscal
appropriation to the program in 1979, was interpreted by the carriers as a Congressional
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lack of commitment for the program. [Ref. 28: p. 407] Moreover, the first appropriation
of only $7.5 million in 1979 further solidified this view.
It is clear that the aforementioned incentives offered to the civil carriers were not
sufficient enough to obtain the required number of CEP participants to meet the nation's
strategic mobility requirement. Even though MAC was able to gain approval to offer
cash incentives to enhancement participants and was also permitted flexibility in
developing tailored reimbursement contacts to the carriers for the increased operating
cost incurred while flying the enhanced aircraft, no additional carriers saw these
incentives as sufficient to motivate participation in the CEP. [Ref. 22:p. 17] Following
the bankruptcy of Pan Am in 1991, AMC officially terminated the CRAP
Enhancement Program. [Ref. 3:p. 25] Consequently, the mobility requirement gap
remained until the strategic mobility requirement was lowered in 1995.
2. MAC's Actions Pertaining to Congressional Concerns
Although MAC was fairly successful at mitigating some of the air carrier
concerns, it was not as successful in dealing with the concerns of Congress. MAC tried,
but was never fully able to convince Congress to provide full support for the
enhancement program.
MAC allayed Congressional concern over the liability issues of the enhancement
aircraft by responding that "the modified aircraft would be certified by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) in a manner similar to the procedure already certifying
and accepting aircraft currently in use." [Ref. 29] Acceptance of this certification
procedure indicated that no additional liability issues should be raised resulting from the
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operation of newly enhanced aircraft. MAC was unable to guarantee access to the
modified aircraft in the event of them being sold or leased. However, it did provide for
the full repayment of the government's investment should they be sold or leased.
[Ref 29]
Prior to the 1979 appropriation, MAC failed to impress upon Congress that the
estimated costs for the conversions were based on modifying several aircraft
concurrently. MAC planners expected that spreading-out non-recurring modification
costs across a larger number of aircraft would result in a lower unit conversion cost. [Ref.
29:p. 56] However, Congress was not aware of this as it only initially appropriated $7.5
million for the program in 1979. If Congress had properly understood the mechanics of
the CEP modification process, it would have realized that the money appropriated would
be far too little to modify even a single aircraft.
MAC was able, however, to convince Congress that the CEP was not just another
airline subsidy. This is evident because MAC was able to gain approval to offer cash
incentives to enhancement participants and was also permitted flexibility in developing
tailored reimbursement contracts to the carriers for the increased operating cost incurred
while flying the enhanced aircraft. However, MAC was never able to fully convince
Congress that the CEP was a cost effective way to increase the nation's cargo capacity
and a worthwhile program to support.
The following chapter presents information on the contemporary concerns of the
military, government, and civil carriers and how these concerns effect the plausibility
of a re-birth of the CEP in today's environment.
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IV. CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT, IMPLICATIONS AND REMEDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The most significant open question is whether or not CEP is a viable option
today for ensuring that the nations strategic mobility requirement can be continually
met. If a new CRAF Enhancement Program were implemented today, it would face a
very different environment than with the first CEP. The contemporary military,
Congressional and airline industry environments are examined in this chapter in relation
to a possible new CEP program. For each of these three institutions, the relevant
environmental factors are first described, followed by implications for CEP and possible
remedies for negative implications.
B. MDLITARY ENVIRONMENT, IMPLICATIONS AND REMEDDES
1. Current Military Environment
Since the development of the enhancement concept 25 years ago, the requirement
placed upon the U.S. military has changed dramatically. First, with the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the threat of attack to the U.S. mainland from "over the horizon" is no
longer present. The nation's military policy is now primarily concerned with U.S.
involvement in regional conflicts around the world. Coupled with the draw-down in
military forces stationed abroad, this results in more emphasis being placed on U.S.
strategic airlift to deploy the required forces in the event of military flair-ups requiring
U.S. military involvement. [Ref 35:p. 34]
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This military draw-down overseas has also lowered the peacetime requirement
for civilian contract airlift augmentation. AMC has estimated that the amount of contract
cargo airlift business offered to the civil air carriers may decrease up to 25 percent by the
year 2001 in comparison to the level of contract airlift procured in the 1980s.
[Ref 30:p. 59] If U.S. foreign policy continues the trend toward limiting U.S. military
contingency and humanitarian military involvement, this trend in lowering peacetime
airlift augmentation will continue.
Second, the current strategic mobility requirement for cargo airlift of 49.7
MTM/D is now attainable using military and CRAF airlift assets. [Ref. 16] This is a
sharp decrease from the strategic airlift requirement of 66 MTM/D required during the
height of the Cold War.
The last, and most important issue, is that the mix of DoD cargo airlift required
for a major regional contingency today differs from that planned for a conflict with the
Soviet Union. According to the 1981 Mobility Requirements Study, 27 percent of the
cargo airlift that DoD planned to send to a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict was outsized,
requiring C-5 (or C-17) aircraft for transportation. By comparison, simulations
conducted in the later 1980s of deployments to Korea and the Persian Gulf suggest that
only 15 percent to 18 percent of required cargo airlift would be outsized. Official data
for the first two weeks of Desert Shield are unavailable, but during the remaining first
four months of deployments, approximately 1 percent of the airlift cargo was outsized,
increasing to 12 percent by the end of the war. [Ref. 17:p. 19] Although it is difficult to




the current areas of interest, such as the Persian Gulf, Korea, and Bosnia,
indicate that the strategic airlift requirement will be similar in the years to come and the
outsized cargo airlift requirement will be less than previously estimated.
2. Implications of Military Environment
The changes in the military environment negatively impact the possibility of
re-implementation of the CEP. The current ability of U.S. military airlift assets and
CRAF participants to meet the nation's strategic airlift requirement introduces one
negative aspect. Previously, MAC had proved to Congress that there existed a need to
fund 60 enhanced airframe modifications to meet the previous mobility requirement.
Now, however, with a slight excess capacity of 1.5 MTM/D, AMC would have to
persuade Congress that the CEP offers supplemental outsized cargo capability that may
be necessary if the nation's future mobility requirement increases. This would be very
difficult to accomplish considering the current draw-down in military forces and military
base closures. Moreover, convincing Congress to fund a program that does not fill a
current need is highly unlikely.
The lowering of the peacetime requirement for civilian contract airlift also
adversely effects a CEP. During the first CEP, airlines were guaranteed an increased
share of available peacetime airlift contracts as incentive to participate in the
program. [Ref 26:p. 46] With the contract cargo airlift business estimated to decrease
by 25 percent, the incentive previously offered may be unavailable. DoD's need for
peacetime passenger transportation via contract and scheduled airlines has also
significantly fallen since the end of the cold war. This smaller passenger market has
reduced the incentive for carrier participation in CRAF in general.
Although the CEP offers a relatively quick method of adding supplemental airlift
capacity, in its previous form it did not provide the availability that was needed by DoD.
During the Gulf War, only CRAF stages one and two were activated, leaving the
enhanced airframes inaccessible since they were to become available only upon stage
three activation. [Ref. 33: p. 27]
3. Remedies for Military Environment
The reduction of peacetime DoD contract airlift creates a negative impact on
AMC's ability to offer increased peacetime DoD airlift contracts as incentives to CEP
participants, such as provided by the Bonus Award Plan. Consequently, AMC could
persuade Congress to make available other forms of CEP incentives. One alternative to
entice participation is to open-up all government travel, in addition to available DoD
contract airlift, to CEP participants. Additionally, a flexible reimbursement plan could
be developed to account for rapid changes in fuel prices in response to the higher fuel
consumption (cost) enhanced aircraft experience.
With a new CEP, the inaccessibility problem could be avoided through the re-
wording of the CRAF activation contractual language. A new CEP could require the
enhanced aircraft to be made available during stages one through three, thereby giving
DoD access to the enhanced aircraft from the beginning of the CRAF activation period.
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C. CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENT, IMPLICATIONS AND REMEDIES
1. Current Congressional Environment
Even though Congress has made sizable cuts in the defense budget over the past
few years, it still realizes the importance of strategic airlift mobility. Congress's decision
to purchase 120 C-17s was made with the realization that as these aircraft roll-off the
assembly line, they would replace the aging and retiring C-141 aircraft. This transition
will maintain or slightly exceed the 49.7 MTM/D strategic airlift requirement.
[Figure. 1]
Congress became disenchanted with the CEP following Pan Am's bankruptcy
after the Gulf War and the consequent inability of the government to access 14 of Pan
Am's 19 enhanced aircraft. [Ref 31: p.31] The five aircraft recovered by the
government have since been modified for other military purposes. [Ref. 31 :p 22]
Although Pan Am's bankruptcy has tainted Congress's view of the CEP, this problem
could be avoided in a future CEP. [Ref. 32]
2. Implications of Congressional Environment
As a result of the fiscal austerity that currently surrounds Congress, it seems
unlikely that Congress would approve funding for a new CEP program given the recent
cost-saving cutbacks in military personnel, equipment, and base operations.
Additionally, if a CEP becomes desirable by AMC, it would be very difficult to convince
Congress to grant appropriations for a CEP program that does not fill a gap as did the
first CEP. The most significant environmental implication is the lingering negative
effect resulting from the first CEP and the government's inability to gain access to all of
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Pan Am's enhanced aircraft. Congress would have a difficult time in over-coming these
implications if a new CEP were proposed today.
3. Remedies for Congressional Environment
In order to protect the government's investment in the enhanced aircraft,
Congress could ensure the access to enhanced airframes via legal contracts in the event
they are leased, sold, or if participating earners encounter financial hardship. For
example, financial liens could be placed on these enhanced aircraft protecting the
government's investment in the event of another civil air carrier financial disaster.
These liens would ensure that the government regains the use of these airframes or
receives financial compensation for the modification costs incurred by the government.
D. AIRLINE ENVIRONMENT, IMPLICATIONS AND REMEDIES
1. Current Airline Environment
The airline industry has changed dramatically since the concept behind the CEP
was first developed in 1973. Issues such as airline deregulation, competition, and the war
in the Persian Gulf have combined to make the current airline environment much
different than it was in previous decades. 3
In 1978, the deregulation of the airline industry resulted in changes to the airline's
day-to-day business. Airlines are now required to be more efficient due to the increased
competition resulting from deregulation. Not only are airlines now required to maintain
a smaller excess capacity for passenger and cargo movements in order to secure a
3 The following information pertains to changes in the airline environment, which has a direct impact on
CRAF, and hence, any future enhancement program like the CEP.
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minimum acceptable profit margin, but they have changed the nature of their
operations as well. [Ref. 31 :p. 42]
Wide-body aircraft are the most desirable for the CRAF in general, and especially
for cargo enhancement programs. However, structural changes in the industry, due to
deregulation and other issues, have had a particularly strong impact on wide-body
aircraft. U.S. airlines are now shifting away from using large wide-body aircraft for
domestic travel in order to accommodate the more efficient hub-and-spoke airport
network that exists today. This network effectively accommodates smaller aircraft such
as the Boeing 737 and 757. Consequently, the decreased number of wide-body aircraft
today are primarily used on international routes. Of the three U.S. carriers that
previously provided the 63 percent of the U.S.'s wide-body fleet, Pan Am filed for
bankruptcy and has since gone out of business, TWA filed for Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy,
and Northwest Airlines has entered into an international partnership with KLM Airlines.
Seventy-eight percent of current orders placed for wide-body aircraft are made by foreign
air carriers. [Ref. 32]
Increased competition has also led to a trend towards leasing aircraft instead of
purchasing. Leasing aircraft provides the carriers with the ability to change the size and
composition of their fleets based upon changes in the market demand. Additionally, it
allows the carriers to have the most modern fleet of aircraft and to take lease-associated
tax advantages. [Ref. 31: p. 17]
Desert Shield also changed the daily operations of the civil air carriers. Desert
Shield required the first-time-ever activation of the CRAF system since its creation 46
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years ago. Participating CRAF carriers made considerable contributions to the war
effort, providing 27 percent of cargo and 60 percent of passenger airlift to the Gulf
region. [Ref 14J However, CRAF participants raised concerns over the potential
frequency of activations. This involvement led some carriers to reanalyze the risk of their
future involvement in the CRAF. [Ref. 34] Primarily, carriers started to raise the issue
about the government's ability to provide adequate insurance coverage related to their
CRAF wartime activation. [Ref. 32]
2. Implications of Airline Environment
The combined effects of airline industry deregulation, increased competition, and
CRAF activation have had negative impacts on the possibility of revitalizing the CEP.
The effects of deregulation and resulting increased competition will make it
difficult for AMC to persuade the airlines to contribute wide-body aircraft for a new
CEP. U.S. airlines have primarily moved to a hub-and-spoke system requiring smaller
aircraft (Boeing 737,757), and the fewer remaining wide-bodies are now used in longer
distance domestic and international travel. If a CEP were implemented, the result would
be fewer wide-body aircraft remaining in service to meet the long distance domestic and
international market demands. Additionally, airlines spend a great deal of time and effort
in gaining even minor increases in their international market share. [Ref. 34] Therefore,
it seems unlikely that the air carriers operating wide-body aircraft would be willing to
contribute their limited number of wide-bodies, at the expense of not meeting customer
demand, to another CEP.
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An additional contemporary trend that negatively impacts the possibility of
revitalizing the CEP is the shift towards international ownership of former US-owned
airlines U.S. Air, Northwest Airlines, and Delta Airlines have all entered formal
contractual agreements with foreign air carriers. [Ref. 30:p. 1 76] Since foreign carriers
are eligible for CRAF participation, steps would have to be taken to ensure that these
foreign carriers agree to the legal guidelines required for CRAF participation and
activation. [Ref. 17:p. 19]
The trend of U.S. carriers to lease aircraft instead of purchasing them also has
negative impacts on the possibility of re-implementing a CEP. Air carriers lease between
50 percent to 75 percent of their aircraft. This percentage depends to some extent on the
size of the carrier and the service area (regional versus national carriers). Smaller
regional carriers tend to lease a greater percentage of aircraft thereby making more use of
the associated tax advantages discussed earlier. Larger and national carriers are more
likely to lease a smaller percentage because of their concern for capital growth. [Ref. 32]
In initiating a new CEP, AMC may be faced with having to persuade both the leasing
company and the airline to perform the "cargo convertible" modifications. The CRAF
obligation of 12 years is essential in maintaining a constant pool of CRAF aircraft to
draw from. However, this time requirement is inconsistent with why carriers lease
aircraft in the first place, to have a "flexible" fleet able to respond quickly to changes in
market demands.
The last negative impact associated with the current airline environment is their
concern over war zone insurance. Although most CRAF participants have renewed their
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CRAF participation since the end of the Gulf War, concern still remains within the
airline industry over the insurance risk inherent in future CRAF activations. [Ref 34]
The government, in response to the carriers' concern over obtaining adequate insurance
coverage while participating in CRAF activations, instituted the Aviation War Risk
Insurance Program in 1985. [Ref. 35:p. 4,5] Normal commercial insurance policies
generally exclude coverage for civil air carriers operating in war zones during CRAF
activation periods. Consequently, commercial carriers flying during a CRAF activation
must generally rely on supplemental insurance programs provided by the government for
carrier aircraft damage and personnel liability claims. The Aviation War Risk Insurance
Program (AWRIP), administered by the FAA, provides this supplemental insurance
coverage. This program generally covers losses due to war, capture, seizure, nuclear
detonation, hijacking, strikes, and vandalism. [Ref. 35 :p. 4]
During the war in the Persian Gulf, CRAF participants showed concern that this
insurance program did not have a balance sufficient enough to cover possible claims. At
the time of the Gulf War, the AWRIP had a $120 million balance. The current balance
of $60 million is even lower. Carriers continue to be concerned that available funds are
insufficient for the timely settlement of insurance claims that may result from any future
CRAF activation. According to USTRANSCOM, this fund is less than half the amount
needed to cover the loss of a single commercial aircraft valued at over $150 million and
substantially less than the estimated $1 billion in associated liabilities. In response, AMC
has initiated legislation proposing the Secretary of Defense tap into unobligated funds
from any source to promptly pay future civil carrier insurance claims. [Ref. 35 :p. 5]
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Until this issue of prompt and adequate insurance coverage repayment is settled, civil
earners will remain concerned over the business risks inherent in future CRAF
activations.
3. Remedies for Airline Environment
As mentioned previously, a number of environmental factors exist that effect the
airlines and their perceived reluctance to reenter into a CEP. In addressing these factors,
AMC should seek relevant airline data and participate closely with the airlines in
designing sufficient incentives. Of these factors, the most easily addressed is the need for
sufficient insurance coverage, and required AVVRTP balance, in the event of a CRAF
activation. Obtaining adequate coverage would greatly reduce the carriers' concern if
their aircraft are damaged or lost during a CRAF activation. AMC and Congress need to
make sure this issue is addressed.
AMC could avoid the pitfall experienced in the old CEP by ensuring an even
distribution of enhanced aircraft among the participating carriers. Doing this would
negate the possibility of the government loosing a majority of enhanced aircraft, as well
as enabling a larger number of airlines to participate.
AMC could also investigate using medium-sized aircraft such as the Boeing 757
or 767 in order to avoid the obstacles involved in using long distance domestic and
international wide-body aircraft. Prior to enhancing any airframe, the airlines and AMC
should analyze each type of aircraft's speed, capacity, and range capability in
determining its suitability for modification. Boeing 767 aircraft could handle some
outsized shipments. However, Boeing 757 aircraft, with their relatively narrow fuselage,
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could only handle oversized cargo.
E. SUMMARY
Although it may appear the CEP has a reasonable chance for success in today's
environment if the previously mentioned remedies are followed, the nation's current
strategic mobility requirement is met and exceeded using available military and CRAF
assets. The difficulty in substantiating a need for enhanced aircraft to augment current
airlift assets, if the need arose, can not be under estimated. Convincing Congress that
money should be appropriated for a program that does not fill a specific need today is
highly improbable. However, as this study has shown, environments change. To be
better prepared, AMC and Congress should examine the airline and military
environments, in addition to their own concerns, on a periodic basis for any changes that
could increase or decrease the viability of implementing a CEP. Although the CEP was a
valid and worthwhile program in its time, that time has changed to a period that no
longer requires "cargo-convertibles."
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Analysis of the data gathered and the current literature reviewed did not reveal
any particularly startling conclusions. Nevertheless, the analysis does point out some
areas where AMC could take some action if it were to re-implement an enhancement
program for commercial aircraft (CEP). This chapter sets forth the major conclusions of
the study as well as specific recommendations for consideration by AMC, Congress, and
airlines. Additionally, it provides answers to the research questions, and
recommendations for further study.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions reached in this research are: ( 1 ) the incentives for participation
in the CEP were inadequate, (2) the current strategic cargo airlift requirement and
combined military and CRAF capacity does not warrant a new CEP, and (3) the current
environments of the military, (4) of Congress, and (5) of the civil air carriers, would
require specific remedies before a new CEP could be effectively developed and
implemented.
1. Inadequate Incentives
During implementation of the CEP, MAC was able to gain participation of only
four airlines. The majority of the airlines did not feel the incentives associated with the
airframe enhancements were large enough to warrant their participation. MAC failed to
achieve its goal of 60 enhanced airframes because MAC was unable to convince
Congress to support the CEP to the level required by most airlines. MAC failed to
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convince Congress that to obtain more than four CEP participants, an incentive plan for
the CEP needed to be developed that was both attractive and cost affective.
2. Current Strategic Cargo Requirement and Capacity
The current combined military and CRAF strategic capacity of 5E2 MTM/D
meets, and slightly exceeds, the strategic cargo requirement of 49.7 MTM/D based on the
MRS BURU. Congressional appropriation for a program that does not fill a current need
is highly unlikely when viewed in conjunction with the recent overall cutbacks in the
military bases, personnel, and equipment.
3. Military Environment
The current military environment has an overall negative impact on revitalizing
the CEP. During Desert Shield, only 10 percent of outsized cargo was moved by the
airlift system, substantially less than the 1 5 percent to 1 8 percent previously estimated.
Because the CEP addresses movement of outsized military cargo, it is difficult to
substantiate the need for a new CEP if this 10 percent is indicative of future airlift cargo
requirements. Additionally, the reduction in the required peacetime DoD contract airlift
negatively impacts AMC's ability to offer increased peacetime airlift contracts as
incentive for participation in a new CEP as it did in the old program.
4. Congressional Bitterness
Following the Gulf War, Congress became disenchanted with the CEP due to
Pan Am's bankruptcy, and then terminated the program. It does not seem likely that
Congress could be swayed towards approving a new CEP in light of the old CEP falling
so short of its 60 enhanced airframe requirement. With the purchase of 120 C-17s acting
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as replacements to the aging and retiring C-141 and C-5 aircraft, the need for additional
airlift capacity has vanished for the time being.
5. Inhospitable Airline Environment
The current airline industry environment is much different than it was during the
CEP's life-span. The combined effects of the airline industry's deregulation, increased
competition, and concerns about adequate CRAF activation insurance coverage, all
negatively impact the possibility of initiating a new CEP. With industry trends toward
aircraft leasing, flying fewer wide-body airframes, developing international partnerships,
and its concern about adequate insurance coverage, any chance for a re-birth of the
CEP seems unlikely.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions of this study lead to several recommendations if a CEP were
deemed necessary. They are: (1) develop adequate incentives to entice CEP
participation, (2) modify the previous CEP activation requirement, (3) ensure a more
even distribution of enhanced airframes over the number of CEP participants, (4)
investigate the possibility of using medium-sized aircraft, (5) investigate the use of
financial liens, (6) reduce CRAF activation concerns, and (7) continue to analyze changes
in the military, Congress, and airline industry that may impact implementation of a CEP
program.
1. Incentives
AMC should search for adequate incentives that address the concerns of airlines
and encourage their participation. For example, develop a flexible reimbursement plan
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that adjusts to the change in fuel prices in response to the higher fuel consumption that
enhanced airframes experience. Legal guidelines could be developed that allow carriers
to use the enhanced capability of their aircraft on a limited basis during peacetime as
long as this does not impair or degrade the enhancement for later military use.
Additionally, the 12 year commitment could be relaxed, thereby giving carriers more
freedom to modify their fleet in response to market demands.
2. Modify CEP Activation Requirement
AMC should change the previous CEP activation requirement from stage III to
include stages I and II.
3. Ensure Even Distribution
AMC should ensure a more even distribution of enhanced aircraft among
participating carriers.
4. Investigate Using Medium-Sized Aircraft
AMC, airlines, and aircraft manufacturers should jointly investigate the
possibility of utilizing medium-sized aircraft such as the Boeing 757 or 767 because of
the relative lack of domestic wide-body aircraft. Prior to enhancing any airframe, AMC
in conjunction with the airlines and manufacturers, should analyze each aircraft's speed,
capacity and range capability in determining its suitability for CEP modification.
5. Investigate Using Financial Liens
Congress could investigate the advantage of placing financial liens on enhanced
airframes to protect the government's investment in the event these aircraft are leased or
sold.
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6. Reduce Activation Concerns
Both AMC and Congress should take action in ensuring the AWRIP is capable of
meeting potential airline insurance claims in the event a CRAF activation is warranted
7. Continual Examination of Environmental Changes
AMC and Congress should continually examine the military and airline
environments for changes that could increase or decrease the viability of implementing a
CEP program.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Based on the lessons learned from the creation and termination of the
CEP, is a re-vita lization of the CEP concept in today's environment warranted?
A revitalization of the CEP is not warranted in today's environment. The
environmental barriers that exist are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. In brief, the
military's environmental barriers are: (1) a draw-down of military forces stationed
domestically and abroad, (2) a decrease in peacetime requirement for civilian contract
airlift augmentation, and (3) less outsized military airlift cargo required than previously
estimated.
In brief, Congress's environmental barriers are: (1) the disenchantment that it
experienced resulting from loosing 14 enhanced aircraft following Pan Am's bankruptcy,
and (2) the inability of the previous CEP to close the gap between requirements and
available assets.
In brief, the air carrier's environmental barriers are: (1) a shift away from wide-
body to medium size aircraft, and hence fewer available wide-body aircraft, (2) an
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increase in competition, (3) a trend toward leasing aircraft, (4) a shift towards
international agreements with foreign airlines, and (5) concern about AWRIP having
sufficient funds. The actions that AMC should take if a CEP were re-implemented are
found in the recommendations section of this chapter.
2. What was the impetus behind the creation of CRAF and what value
does it play within the national airlift system in meeting defense cargo
transportation needs?
CRAF was created as a result of need for additional airlift transportation assets
following World War II and during the Korean Conflict. In 1952, a Joint Memorandum
of Understanding officially created CRAF which formalized agreements between DoD
and the airlines for the use of their aircraft during military contingencies. Currently,
CRAF participants contribute 30 percent of the strategic cargo requirement.
3. What was the role of CEP within the larger CRAF program and what
were the expected advantages of CEP?
The role of the CEP was to bridge the strategic mobility cargo requirements gap
present in the 1980s by modifying wide-body aircraft active in the CRAF program
making them capable of carrying outsized military cargo. The expected advantages of the
CEP were to offer a method of increasing supplemental cargo airlift capability without
air carriers having to purchase more aircraft, and provided a means for quickly nullifying
the then-present cargo airlift capability shortfall since no major design or development
phases were required.
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4. What were the dominant problems inherent in the CEP and were
these problems unavoidable?
The dominate problems inherent in the CEP are categorized in two areas: the
concerns of the civil air carriers and the concerns of Congress. They are discussed in
detail in Chapter III. In brief they are: (1) carrier concerns over the profitability of
participation including modification reimbursement, increased operating cost, and level
of perceived Congressional commitment, and (2) Congress's concern regarding the
CEP's effectiveness and associated government liability issues that could result from
possible accidents attributed to the enhanced modifications.
These problems were avoidable if MAC had convinced Congress that greater
incentives must be provided to participating earners to entice more participation and this
program deserved Congress's full financial support.
5. What were some of the legal guidelines utilized in CEP and could they
be re-written to help ensure an effective CEP program today?
Some of the legal guidelines used in the CEP are discussed in detail in Chapter
III. In brief they were: ( 1 ) initially utilizing existing airframes for modification then
transitioning to airframes in production, (2) government reimbursement for modification
costs, (3) carrier agreement not to utilize enhanced airframes during peacetime, (4) 12
year enhanced aircraft commitment, and (5) full reimbursement for increased operating
cost. Suggested legal guideline modifications are presented in the recommendations
section.
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6. What were the incentives available to CEP participants and were they
sufficient? Would they be sufficient today?
The available incentives for CEP participants were government subsidization for
modification costs, reimbursement for increased operating costs, government guaranteed
loans, low interest loans, tax and depreciation incentives, assistance in obtaining required
procurement insurance, Bonus Award Plan, and providing an initial $500,000 cash
incentive for participation in the CEP. To overcome the negative environment with
regard to implementing a CEP, these incentives, although sizable, are not sufficient to
entice participation today.
7. Was the scope of acceptable participants in CEP too limited? Should
it have been widened to include all civilian airlines?
The scope of the acceptable participants was not too limited and did not require
widening to include all airlines. If the incentives were more enticing, thereby making
participation more appealing to the carriers, MAC most likely would have achieved its
goal of 60 enhanced airframes.
8. Given the aging of the nation's legacy transport aircraft (C-l 41 and
C-5), and the cutback to procure only 120 C-17s, what position is AMC in to ensure
current defense cargo transportation requirements are met?
With the current strategic cargo requirement of 49 7 MTM/D and the capacity of
the military and CRAF cargo airlift assets at 51.2 MTM/D, AMC meets and exceeds the
strategic requirement into the foreseeable future.
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9. Was the scope of aircraft type too limited in the CEP and should it be
modified to include not just wide-body aircraft but medium size aircraft if the CEP
were re-implemented?
At the time of CEP concept development and implementation, a greater number
of wide-body aircraft were in both domestic and international service than exist today.
Consequently, there existed an adequate number of wide-body aircraft available for
enhancement modification. However, wide-body availability has diminished. Actions
pertaining to utilizing medium-size aircraft are found in the recommendations section.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Future Environmental Study
More study should address what the future may hold in terms of military,
Congressional, and airline industry environments in relation to the strategic mobility
requirement and capability. Once this is performed, the applicability and feasibility of a
future CEP can be analyzed.
2. Future Incentives
A study should be conducted analyzing the required incentives of a future CEP.
Doing this, and if a new CEP was deemed necessary, the future CEP could avoid the
problems experienced by the first program and provide incentives that the airlines would
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